Preventing unauthorized data flows by Uzun E. et al.
Preventing Unauthorized Data Flows
Emre Uzun1(B), Gennaro Parlato2, Vijayalakshmi Atluri3, Anna Lisa Ferrara2,
Jaideep Vaidya3, Shamik Sural4, and David Lorenzi3
1 Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey
emreu@bilkent.edu.tr
2 University of Southampton, Southampton, UK
gennaro@ecs.soton.ac.uk, al.ferrara@soton.ac.uk
3 MSIS Department, Rutgers Business School, Newark, USA
{atluri,jsvaidya,dlorenzi}@cimic.rutgers.edu
4 Department of Computer Science and Engineering,
IIT Kharagpur, Kharagpur, India
shamik@cse.iitkgp.ernet.in
Abstract. Trojan Horse attacks can lead to unauthorized data flows
and can cause either a confidentiality violation or an integrity violation.
Existing solutions to address this problem employ analysis techniques
that keep track of all subject accesses to objects, and hence can be expen-
sive. In this paper we show that for an unauthorized flow to exist in an
access control matrix, a flow of length one must exist. Thus, to eliminate
unauthorized flows, it is sufficient to remove all one-step flows, thereby
avoiding the need for expensive transitive closure computations. This
new insight allows us to develop an efficient methodology to identify and
prevent all unauthorized flows leading to confidentiality and integrity
violations. We develop separate solutions for two different environments
that occur in real life, and experimentally validate the efficiency and
restrictiveness of the proposed approaches using real data sets.
1 Introduction
It is well known that access control models such as Discretionary Access Control
(DAC) and Role Based Access Control (RBAC) suffer from a fundamental weak-
ness – their inability to prevent leakage of data to unauthorized users through
malware, or malicious or complacent user actions. This problem, also known
as a Trojan Horse attack, may lead to an unauthorized data flow that may
cause either a confidentiality or an integrity violation. More specifically, (i) a
confidentiality violating flow is the potential flow of sensitive information from
trusted users to untrusted users that occurs via an illegal read operation, and
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(ii) integrity violating flow is the potential contamination of a sensitive object
that occurs via an illegal write operation by an untrusted user. We now give an
example to illustrate these two cases.
Table 1. Access control matrix
Subject o1 o2 o3 o4 o5 o6 o7
s1 r r w w w
s2 r r w w w
s3 r r r w w
s4 r r r w w
s5 r
Example 1. Consider a DAC policy represented as an access control matrix given
in Table 1 (r represents read , and w represents write).
Confidentiality Violating Flow: Suppose s3 wants to access data in o1. s3 can
simply accomplish this (without altering the access control rights) by exploiting
s1’s read access to o1. s3 prepares a malicious program disguised in an application
(i.e., a Trojan Horse) to accomplish this. When run by s1, and hence using her
credentials, the program will read contents of o1 and write them to o3, which s3
can read. All this is done without the knowledge of s1. This unauthorized data
flow allows s3 to read the contents of o1, without explicitly accessing o1.
Integrity Violating Flow: Suppose s1 wants to contaminate the contents of
o6, but she does not have an explicit write access to it. She prepares a malicious
program. When this is run by s3, it will read from o3, that s1 has write access
to and s3 has read access, and write to o6 using s3’s credentials, causing o6 to
be contaminated by whatever s1 writes to o3. This unauthorized flow allows s1
to write to o6 without explicitly accessing o6.
Such illegal flows can occur in the many of the most common systems that we
use today because they employ DAC policies instead of a more restrictive MAC
policy [2]. For example, in UNIX, the key system files are only readable by root,
however, the access control rights of the other files are determined solely by the
users. If a Trojan horse program is run with the root user’s privileges, the data
in the system files, such as the user account name and password hashes could be
leaked to some untrusted users. As another example, a similar flow might occur
in Social Networks as well. For instance, Facebook offers a very extensive and
fine-grained privacy policy to protect the data posted on user profiles. However,
this policy is under the user’s control. A Trojan horse attack is likely when the
users grant access to third party Facebook applications, that usually request
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access to user profile data. An untrusted application could violate the user’s
privacy settings and access confidential information.
The first step for eliminating occurrences like the ones depicted in the exam-
ple above is to perform a security analysis. To date, existing solutions to address
such problems give the impression that such unauthorized flows could only be
efficiently prevented in a dynamic setting (i.e., only by examining the actual
operations), while preventing them in a static setting (i.e., by examining the
authorization specifications) would require the computation of the transitive
closure and therefore be very expensive. However, in this paper, we show that
a transitive closure is not needed for the static case and less expensive analy-
ses can be used to solve this problem. More precisely, we have discovered that
merely identifying and then restricting a single step data flow, as opposed to
the entire path, is sufficient to prevent the unauthorized flow. This new insight
has significantly changed the dimensions of the problem and allows us to offer a
variety of strategies that fit different situational needs.
Consider the following situations which have differing solution requirements.
For example, in embedded system environments complex monitors cannot be
deployed due to their computation or power requirements and therefore existing
dynamic preventive strategies are not applicable. Similarly, there are solutions
for cryptographic access control [8,13], where accesses are not mediated by a
centralized monitor and therefore easily offer distributed trust. In such cases,
the access control policy needs to be “data leakage free” by design. In other sit-
uations, when there are no special computational or power constraints, a monitor
can be used, and therefore can be utilized to prevent data leakages. However,
there may also be situations where access needs to be granted even if a data
leakage may occur and then audited after the fact. This would happen in emer-
gencies, which is why break-glass models exist [5,23,25].
Therefore, in this paper, we develop different solutions to address both the
confidentiality and integrity violations. Specifically, we propose a data leak-
age free by design approach that analyzes the access control matrix to identify
“potential” unauthorized flows and eliminates them by revoking necessary read
and write permissions. Since this eliminates all potential unauthorized flows,
regardless of whether they actually occur or not, this could be considered too
restrictive. However, it is perfectly secure in the sense that no data leakages can
ever occur, and of course this is the only choice when monitoring is not feasible.
Although it may seem very restrictive in the first place, we apply this only to
the untrusted sections of the access control system. It is important to note that
in all potential unauthorized flows one can only be sure of a violation by per-
forming a content analysis of the objects. This is outside the scope of the paper.
We also develop a monitor based approach, in which object accesses are tracked
dynamically at each read and write operation. Thus, any suspicious activity that
could lead to an unauthorized data flow can be identified and prevented at the
point of time that it occurs. Thus, this approach only restricts access if there is
a signal for an unauthorized data flow.
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The fact that it is adequate to identify and eliminate one-step flows allows
us to identify a limited set of accesses that are both necessary and sufficient to
prevent all confidentiality and integrity violations. On the other hand, earlier
approaches proposed in the literature [17,21,32] keep track of all the actions
and maintain information relevant to these to eliminate unauthorized flows, and
therefore are more expensive than our proposed approach. Moreover, while Mao
et al. [21] and Zimmerman et al. [32] address the issue of integrity violation,
Jaume et al. [17] address the issue of confidentiality violation, however, none of
them tackle both of these problems.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we present preliminary back-
ground for our analysis, and in Sects. 3 and 4 we present the details of the two
strategies. In Sect. 5, we present the results of our empirical evaluation. In Sect. 6,
we review the related work. In Sect. 7, we give our concluding remarks and pro-
vide an insight into our future work on this problem. Some of the proofs of the
theorems and lemmas are presented in the Appendix.
2 Preliminaries
Access Control Systems. An access control system (ACS for short) C is a
tuple (S,O,→r,→w), where S is a finite set of subjects, O is a finite set of
objects, →r⊆ O × S, and →w⊆ S × O. We always assume that O and S are
disjoint. A pair (o, s) ∈→r, also denoted o →r s, is a permission representing
that subject s can read object o. Similarly, a pair (s, o) ∈→w, denoted s →w o, is
a permission representing that subject s can write into object o. For the sake of
simplicity, we consider only read and write permissions as any other operation
can be rewritten as a sequence of read and write operations.
Graph Representation of ACS. An ACS can be naturally represented with a
bipartite directed graph [30]. The graph of an ACS, C = (S,O,→r,→w), denoted
GC , is the bipartite graph (S,O,→) whose partition has the parts S and O with
edges →= (→r ∪ →w). Figure 1 shows the graph representation of the ACS
shown in Table 1.
o1
s1
o2 o3 o4 o5 o6 o7
s2 s3 s4 s5
Fig. 1. Graph representation of the ACS given in Table 1
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Vulnerability Paths. In an access control system C, a flow path from object
o to object o′, denoted o  o′, is a path in GC from o to o′, which points out
the possibility of copying the content of o into o′. The length of a flow path
corresponds to the number of subjects along the path. For example, o1 →r
s1 →w o3 (denoted as o1  o3) is a flow path of length 1, while o1 →r s1 →w
o3 →r s3 →w o6 (denoted as o1  o6) is a flow path of length 2 of the ACS
shown in Fig. 1. In all, there are 12 flow paths of length 1, while there are 4 flow
paths of length 2 in the ACS shown in Fig. 1.
Confidentiality Vulnerability: An ACS C has a confidentiality vulnerability, if
there are two objects o and o′, and a subject s such that o  o′ →r s (confi-
dentiality vulnerability path or simply vulnerability path), and o →r s. A confi-
dentiality vulnerability, shows that subject s (the violator) can potentially read
the content of object o through o′, though s is not allowed to read directly from
o. We represent confidentiality vulnerabilities using triples of the form (o, o′, s).
For example, the ACS depicted in Fig. 1 has the confidentiality vulnerability
(o1, o3, s3) since o1  o3 and o3 →r s3 but o1 →r s3. Similarly, (o2, o6, s5) is
another confidentiality vulnerability since o2  o6 and o6 →r s5 but o2 →r s5.
In total, there are 15 confidentiality vulnerabilities:
(o1, o3, s3), (o1, o3, s4), (o1, o4, s3), (o1, o4, s4), (o1, o5, s3), (o1, o5, s4), (o2, o3, s3),
(o2, o3, s4), (o2, o4, s3), (o2, o4, s4), (o2, o5, s3), (o2, o5, s4), (o5, o6, s5), (o1, o6, s5),
(o2, o6, s5).
Integrity Vulnerability: An ACS C has an integrity vulnerability, if there exist a
subject s, and two objects o and o′ such that s →w o, o  o′ (integrity vulnera-
bility path or simply vulnerability path) and s →w o′. An integrity vulnerability,
shows that subject s (the violator) can indirectly write into o′ using the path
flow from o to o′, though s is not allowed to write directly into o′. We represent
integrity vulnerabilities using triples of the form (s, o, o′). For example, the ACS
depicted in Fig. 1 has the integrity vulnerability (s1, o3, o6) since o3  o6 and
s1 →w o3 but s1 →w o6. In total, there are 12 integrity vulnerabilities:
(s1, o3, o6), (s1, o3, o7), (s1, o4, o6), (s1, o4, o7), (s1, o5, o6), (s1, o5, o7), (s2, o3, o6),
(s2, o3, o7), (s2, o4, o6), (s2, o4, o7), (s2, o5, o6), (s2, o5, o7).
When an ACS has either a confidentiality or an integrity vulnerability, we
simply say that C has a vulnerability, whose length is that of its underlying
vulnerability path. Thus, for the ACS depicted in Fig. 1, there are 15 + 12 = 27
vulnerabilities.
Data Leakages. A vulnerability in an access control system does not necessarily
imply that a data leakage (confidentiality or integrity violation) occurs. Rather,
a leakage can potentially happen unless it is detected and blocked beforehand,
using for example a monitor. Before we define this notion formally, we first
develop the necessary formalism.
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A run of an ACS C is any finite sequence π = (s1, op1, o1) . . . (sn, opn, on)
of triples (or actions) from the set S × {read ,write} × O such that for every
i ∈ [1, n] one of the following two cases holds:
(Read) opi = read , and oi →r si;
(Write) opi = write, and si →w oi.
A run π represents a sequence of allowed read and write operations executed
by subjects on objects. More specifically, at step i ∈ [n] subject si accomplishes
the operation opi on object oi. Furthermore, si has the right to access oi in
the opi mode. A run π has a flow from an object ô1 to a subject ŝk pro-
vided there is a flow path ô1 →r ŝ1 →w ô2 . . . ôk and ôk →r ŝk such that
(ŝ1, read , ô1)(ŝ1,write, ô2) . . . (ŝk, read , ôk) is a sub-sequence of π. Similarly, we
can define flows from subjects to objects, objects to objects, and subjects to
subjects.
Confidentiality Violation: A run π of an ACS C has a confidentiality violation,
provided there is a confidentiality vulnerability path from an object o to a subject
s and π has a flow from o to s. An ACS C has a confidentiality violation if there
is a run of C with a confidentiality violation.
Thus, for example, in the ACS depicted in Fig. 1, a confidentiality violation
would occur if there was a sequence (s1, read , o1)(s1,write, o3)(s3, read , o3) which
was a sub-sequence of π.
Integrity Violation: A run π of an ACS C has an integrity violation, provided
there is an integrity vulnerability path from a subject s to an object o and π
has a flow from s to o. An ACS C has an integrity violation if there is a run of
C with an integrity violation.
As above, in the ACS depicted in Fig. 1, a integrity violation would occur, for
example, if there was a sequence (s2,write, o4)(s3, read , o4)(s3,write, o7) which
was a sub-sequence of π.
An ACS has a data leakage if it has either a confidentiality or an integrity vio-
lation. From the definitions above it is straightforward to see that the following
property holds.
Proposition 1. An access control system is data leakage free if and only if it
is vulnerability free.
The direct consequence of the proposition above suggests that a vulnerability
free access control system is data leakage free by design, hence it does not require
a monitor to prevent data leakages.
Fundamental Theorem. We now prove a simple and fundamental property of
ACS that constitutes one of the building blocks for our approaches for checking
and eliminating vulnerabilities/data leakages as shown later in the paper.
Theorem 1. Let C be an access control system. C has a vulnerability only if C
has a vulnerability of length one. In particular, let ρ = o0 →r s0 →w o1 . . . sn−1
→w on be vulnerability path of minimal length. Then, if ρ is a confidentiality
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(resp., integrity) vulnerability then o0 →r s0 →w o1 (resp., o0 →r s0 →w on) is
a confidentiality (resp., integrity) vulnerability of length one.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Assume that n is greater than one by
hypothesis. We first consider the case of confidentiality vulnerability. Let s be
the violator. Since ρ is of minimal length, all objects along ρ except o0 can
be directly read by s (i.e., oi →r s for every i ∈ [1, n]), otherwise there is
an confidentiality vulnerability of smaller length. Thus, o0 →r s0 →w o1 is a
confidentiality vulnerability of length one, as s can read from o1 but cannot read
from o0. A contradiction.
We give a similar proof for integrity vulnerabilities. Again, since ρ is of min-
imal length, all objects along ρ, except o0, can be directly written by s0, i.e.,
s0 →w oi for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. But, this entails that o0 →r s0 →w on is an
integrity vulnerability of length one (as s can write into o0 but cannot directly
write into on). Again, a contradiction.
We now present two alternative strategies for preventing data flows, which
fit different environments.
3 Access Control Systems Data Leakage Free by Design
When a monitor is not possible or even doable the only solution to get an access
control that is free of data leakages is that of having the ACS free of vulnerabil-
ities (see Proposition 1). In this section, we propose an automatic approach that
turns any ACS into one free of vulnerabilities by revoking certain rights.
This can be naively achieved by removing all read and write permissions. How-
ever, this would make the whole approach useless. Instead, it is desirable to mini-
mize the changes to the original access control matrix so as not to disturb the users’
ability to perform their job functions, unless it is absolutely needed. Furthermore,
the removal of these permissions should take into account the fact that some of
them may belong to trusted users (i.e. subjects), such as system administrators,
and therefore we want to prevent the removal of these permissions.
We show that this problem is NP-complete (see Sect. 3.1). Therefore, an effi-
cient solution is unlikely to exist (unless P = NP). To circumvent this compu-
tational difficulty, we propose compact encodings of this optimization problem
into integer linear programming (ILP) by exploiting Theorem1 (see Sects. 3.2
and 3.3). The main goal is that of leveraging efficient solvers for ILP, which
nowadays exist. We show that this approach is promising in practice in Sect. 5.
Maximal Data Flow Problem (MDFP). Let C = (S,O,→r,→w) be an
access control system, and T = (→tr,→tw) be the sets of trusted permissions
where →tr⊆→r and →tw⊆→w. A pair Sol = (→solr ,→solw ) is a feasible solution
of C and T , if →tr⊆→solr ⊆→r, →tw⊆→solw ⊆→w and C′ = (S,O,→solr ,→solw ) does
not have any threat. The size of a feasible solution Sol , denoted size(Sol), is the
value | →solr | + | →solw |. The MDFP is to maximize size(Sol).
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3.1 MDFP is NP-complete
Here we show that the decision problem associated to MDFP is NP-complete.
Given an instance I = (C, T ) of MDFP and a positive integer K, the decision
problem associated to MDFP, called D-MDFP, asks if there is a feasible solution
of I of size greater or equal to K.
Theorem 2. D-MDFP is NP-complete.
See Appendix 7.2 for the proof.
3.2 ILP Formulation
Here we define a reduction from MDFP to integer linear programming (ILP).
In the rest of this section, we denote by I = (C, T ) to be an instance of MDFP,
where C = (S,O,→r,→w) and T = (→tr,→tw).
The set of variables V of the ILP formulation is:
V = {ro,s | o ∈ O ∧ s ∈ S ∧ o →r s} ∪ {ws,o | s ∈ S ∧ o ∈ O ∧ o →r s}
The domain of the variables in V is {0, 1}, and the intended meaning of these
variables is the following. Let ηI : V → {0, 1} be an assignment of the variables in
V corresponding to an optimal solution of the ILP formulation. Then, a solution
for I is obtained by removing all permissions corresponding to the variables
assigned to 0 by ηI . Formally, SolηI = (→solr ,→solw ) is a solution for I, where
→solr = { (o, s) | o ∈ O ∧ s ∈ S ∧ o →r s ∧ ηI(ro,s) = 1 }
→solw = { (s, o) | s ∈ S ∧ o ∈ O ∧ s →w o ∧ ηI(ws,o) = 1 }.
The main idea on how we define the ILP encoding, hence its correctness,
derives straightforwardly from Theorem1: we impose that every flow path of
length one, say o →r ŝ →w o′, if these permissions remain in the resulting access
control system C′ = (S,O,→solr ,→solw ), then it must be the case that for every
subject s ∈ S if s can read from o′ in C′, s must also be able to read from o in
C′ (Confidentiality), and if s that can write into o in C′, s must be also able
to write into o′ in C′ (Integrity). Formally, the linear equations of our ILP
formulation is the minimal set containing the following.
Confidentiality Constraints: For every sequence of the form o →r ŝ →w ô →r s,
we add the constraint: ro,ŝ +wŝ,ô +rô,s −G ≤ 2 where G is ro,s in case o →r s,
otherwise G = 0. For example, for the sequence o1 →r s1 →w o3 →r s2, in the
ACS depicted in Fig. 1(a), we have ro1,s1 + ws1,o3 + ro3,s2 − 0 ≤ 2.
Integrity Constraints: For every sequence of the form s →w o →r ŝ →w ô, we
add the constraint: ws,o + ro,ŝ +wŝ,ô −G ≤ 2 where G is ws,ô in case s →w ô,
otherwise G = 0. As above, for the sequence s2 →w o4 →r s3 →w o7, in the ACS
depicted in Fig. 1(a), we add the constraint ws2,o4 + ro4,s3 + ws3,o7 − 0 ≤ 2.
Trusted Read Constraints: For every o →tr s, we have the constraint: ro,s = 1.
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Trusted Write Constraints: For every s →tw o, we have the constraint: ws,o = 1.
It is easy to see that any variable assignment η that obeys all linear con-
straints defined above leads to a feasible solution of I.
Objective Function: Now, to maximize the number of remaining permissions (or
equivalently, minimize the number of removed permissions) we define the objec-
tive function of the ILP formulation as the sum of all variables in V. Compactly,





ro,ŝ + wŝ,ô + rô,s − ro,s≤ 2,∀ o →r ŝ →w ô →r s, o →r s
ro,ŝ + wŝ,ô + rô,s ≤ 2,∀ o →r ŝ →w ô →r s, o →r s
ws,ô + rô,ŝ + wŝ,o − ws,o≤ 2,∀ s →w ô →r ŝ →w o, s →w o
ws,ô + rô,ŝ + wŝ,o ≤ 2,∀ s →w ô →r ŝ →w o, s →w o
ro,s = 1, ∀ o →tr s; ws,o = 1, ∀ s →tw o; v ∈ {0, 1}, ∀v ∈ V
Fig. 2. ILP formulation of MDFP.
We now formally state the correctness of our ILP approach, which is entailed
from the fact that we remove the minimal number of permissions from C resulting
in a new ACS that does not have any threat of length one, hence from Theorem1
does not have any threat at all.
Theorem 3. For any instance I of MDFP, if ηI is an optimal solution of ILP -
formulation(I) then SolηI is an optimal solution of I.
We note that while the ILP formulation gives the optimal solution, solving
two subproblems (one for confidentiality followed by the one for integrity each
with only the relevant constraints) does not give an optimal solution.
For example, for the ACS depicted in Fig. 1(a), if we only eliminate the 15
confidentiality vulnerabilities, the optimal solution is to revoke 5 permissions
(o1 →r s1, o2 →r s1, o1 →r s2, o2 →r s2, and o6 →r s5). This eliminates
all of the confidentiality, while all of the original integrity vulnerabilities still
exist. No new vulnerabilities are added. Now, if the integrity vulnerabilities are
to be eliminated, the optimal solution is to revoke 4 permissions (s3 →w o6,
s3 →w o7, s4 →w o6, s4 →w o7). Thus, the total number of permissions revoked
is 9. However, if both confidentiality and integrity vulnerabilities are eliminated
together (using the composite ILP in Fig. 2), the optimal solution is to simply
revoke 6 permissions (o3 →r s3, o4 →r s3, o5 →r s3, o3 →r s4, o4 →r s4,
o5 →r s4), which is clearly lower than 9.
50 E. Uzun et al.
3.3 Compact ILP Formulation
We now present an improved encoding that extends the ILP formulation
described in Sect. 3.2 by merging subjects and objects that have the same per-
missions. This allows us to get a much reduced encoding, in terms of variables,
with better performances in practice (see Sect. 5).
Equivalent Subjects: For an instance I = (C, T ) of MDFP with
C = (S,O,→r,→w) and T = (→tr,→tw), two subjects are equivalent if they
have the same permissions. Formally, for a subject s ∈ S, let readI(s) (respec-
tively, read tI(s)) denote the set of all objects that can be read (respectively,
trust read) by s in C, i.e., readI(s) = {o ∈ O | o →r s} (respectively,
read tI(s) = {o ∈ O | o →tr s}). Similarly, we define writeI(s) = {o ∈ O | s →w o}
and writetI(s) = {o ∈ O | s →tw o}. Then, two subjects s1 and s2 are
equivalent, denoted s1 ≈ s2, if readI(s1)readI(s2), read tI(s1) = read tI(s2),
writeI(s1) = writeI(s2), and writetI(s1) = write
t
I(s2).
For every s ∈ S, [s] is the equivalence class of s w.r.t. ≈. Moreover, S≈
denotes the quotient set of S by ≈. Similarly, we can define the same notion of
equivalent objects, with [o] denoting the the equivalence class of o ∈ O, and O≈
denoting the quotient set of O by ≈.
Given a read relation →r⊆ O×S and two subjects s1, s2 ∈ S, →r [s1/s2] is a
new read relation obtained from →r by assigning to s2 the same permissions that
s1 has in →r: →r [s1/s2] = (→r \ (O×{s2}) )∪ {(o, s2) | o ∈ O ∧ o →r s1}.
Similarly, →w [s1/s2] = (→w \ ({s2}×O) )∪ {(s2, o) | o ∈ O ∧ s1 →w o}.
A similar substitution can be defined for objects.
The following lemma states that for any given optimal solution of I it is
always possible to derive a new optimal solution in which two equivalent subjects
have the same permissions.
Lemma 1. Let I = (C, T ) be an instance of the MDFP problem, s1 and s2 be
two equivalent subjects of I, and Sol ′ = (→solr ,→solw ) be a optimal solution of I.
Then, Sol ′′ = (→solr [s1/s2],→solw [s1/s2]) is also an optimal solution of I.
See Appendix 7.1 for the proof.
The following property is a direct consequence of Lemma 1.
Corollary 1. Let I = (C, T ) with C = (S,O,→r,→w) be an instance of the
MDFP problem that admits a solution. Then, there exists a solution Sol =
(→solr ,→solw ) of I such that for every pair of equivalent subjects s1, s2 ∈ S, s1
and s2 have the same permissions in C = (S,O,→solr ,→solw ).
Lemma 1 and Corollary 1 also hold for equivalent objects. Proofs are similar
to those provided above and hence we omit them here.
Compact ILP formulation. Corollary 1 suggests a more compact encoding of the
MDFP into ILP. From C, we define a new ACS C≈ by collapsing all subjects and
objects into their equivalence classes defined by ≈, and by merging permissions
consequently (edges of GC). Formally, C≈ has S≈ as set of subjects and O≈ as set
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max
[o]→≈r [s]
| [o] | · | [s] | · r[o],[s] +
[s]→≈w [o]
| [s] | · | [o] | · w[s],[o]
subject to
r[o],[ŝ] + w[ŝ],[ô] + r[ô],[s] − r[o],[s] ≤ 2, ∀[o] →≈r [ŝ] →≈w [ô] →≈r [s] ∧ [o] →r [s]
r[o],[ŝ] + w[ŝ],[ô] + r[ô],[s] ≤ 2, ∀[o] →≈r [ŝ] →≈w [ô] →≈r [s] ∧ [o] →r [s]
w[s],[ô] + r[ô],[ŝ] + w[ŝ],[o] − w[s],[o] ≤ 2, ∀[s] →≈w [ô] →≈r [ŝ] →≈w [o] ∧ [s] →w [o]
w[s],[ô] + r[ô],[ŝ] + w[ŝ],[o] ≤ 2, ∀[s] →≈w [ô] →≈r [ŝ] →≈w [o] ∧ [s] →w [o]
r[o],[s] = 1, ∀[o] →tr [s]; w[s],[o] = 1, ∀[s] →tw [o]; v ∈ {0, 1}, ∀v ∈ V≈
Fig. 3. ILP formulation of MDFP based on equivalence classes.
of objects, where the read and write permission sets are defined as follows: →≈r =
{ ( [o], [s] ) | o ∈ O ∧ s ∈ S ∧ o →r s },→≈w= { ( [o], [s] ) | s ∈ S ∧ o ∈ O ∧
s →w o }. Similarly, we define the trusted permissions of C≈ as T≈ = (→tr≈,→tw≈)
where →tr≈ = { ( [o], [s] ) | o ∈ O ∧ s ∈ S ∧ o →tr s },→tw≈ = { ( [o], [s] ) |
s ∈ S ∧ o ∈ O ∧ s →tw o }.
We now define a new ILP encoding, Compact-ILP-formulation(I), for
MFDP on the instance (C≈, T≈), which is similar to that of Fig. 2 with the
difference that now edges may have a weight greater than one; reflecting the
number of edges of C it represents in C≈. More specifically, each edge from a
node x1 to x2 in GC≈ represents all edges from all nodes in [x1] to all nodes in
[x2], i.e., its weight is |[x1]| · |[x2]|. Figure 1(b) shows the compact representation
of Fig. 1(a), where the edges have the appropriate weights.
Figure 3 shows Compact-ILP-formulation(I) over the set of variables V≈.
The set of linear constraints is the same as those in Fig. 2 with the difference
that now they are defined over C≈ rather than C. Instead, the objective function
is similar to that of Fig. 2, but now captures the new weighting attributed to
edges in GC≈ .
Let η≈I : V → {0, 1} be a solution to the ILP instance of Fig. 3. Define ̂Solη≈I =
(→̂rsol , →̂wsol) where →̂rsol={ (o, s) ∈ O × S | o →r s ∧ η≈I (r[o],[s]) ≥ 1 }
and →̂wsol={ (s, o) ∈ S × O | s →w o ∧ η≈I (w[s],[o]) ≥ 1 }.
We now prove that Solη≈I is an optimal solution of I.
Theorem 4. For any instance I of MDFP, if η≈I is an optimal solution of
Compact-ILP-formulation(I) then ̂Solη≈I is an optimal solution of I. Fur-
thermore, if I admits a solution then η≈I also exists.
See Appendix 7.3 for the proof.
4 Preventing Data Leakages with Monitors
A data-leakage monitor or simply monitor of an access control system C is a
computing system that by observing the behaviors on C (i.e., the sequence of read
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and write operations) detects and prevents data leakages (both confidentiality
and integrity violations) by blocking subjects’ operations. In this section, we
present a monitor based on a tainting approach. We first define monitors as
language acceptors of runs of C that are data leakage free. We then present a
monitor based on tainting and then conclude with an optimized version of this
monitor that uses only 2-step tainting, leading to better empirical performances.
Monitors. Let C = (S,O,→r,→w) be an ACS, Σ = S × {read ,write} × O be
the set of all possible actions on C, and R = {accept , reject}. A monitor M of
C is a triple (Q, qst , δ) where Q is a set of states, qst ∈ Q is the start state, and
δ : (Q × R × Σ) → (Q × R) is a (deterministic) transition function.
A configuration of M is a pair (q, h) where q ∈ Q and h ∈ R. For a word
w = σ1 . . . σm ∈ Σ∗ with actions σi ∈ Σ for i ∈ [1,m], a run of M on w is a
sequence of m + 1 configurations (q0, h0), . . . (qm, hm) where q0 is the start state
qst , h0 = accept , and for every i ∈ [1,m] the following holds: hi−1 = accept and
(qi, hi) = δ(qi−1, hi−1, σi), or hi−1 = hi = reject and qi = qi−1.
A word w (run of C) is accepted by M if hm = accept . The language of M,
denoted L(M), is the set of all words w ∈ Σ∗ that are accepted by M.
A monitor M is maximal data leakage preserving (MDLP, for short) if L(M)
is the set of all words in Σ∗ that are confidentiality and integrity free. For any
given ACS C, it is easy to show that an MDLP monitor can be built. This can be
proved by showing that L(M) is a regular language: we can easily express the
properties of the words in L(M) with a formula ϕ of monadic second order logic
(MSO) on words and then use an automatic procedure to convert ϕ into a finite
state automaton [14]. Although, this is a convenient way of building monitors
for regular properties, it can lead to automata of exponential size in the number
of objects and subjects. Hence, it is not practical for real access control systems.
Building Maximal Data-Leakage Preserving Monitors. A monitor based
on tainting can be seen as a dynamic information flow tracking system that is
used to detect data flows (see for example [17,21,22]).
An MDLP monitor Mtaint based on tainting associates each subject and
object with a subset of subjects and objects (tainting sets). Mtaint starts in a
state where each subject and object is tainted with itself. Then, Mtaint progres-
sively scans the sequence of actions on C. For each action, say from an element
x1 to an element x2, Mtaint updates its state by propagating the tainting from
x1 to x2. These tainting sets can be seen as a way to represent the endpoints
of all flows: if x2 is tainted by x1, then there is a flow from x1 to x2. Thus, by
using these flows and the definitions of confidentiality and integrity violations,
Mtaint detects data leakages.
More formally, an Mtaint state is a map taint : (S ∪ O) → 2(S∪O). A state
taint is a start state if taint(x) = {x}, for every x ∈ (S ∪ O). The transition
relation δ of Mtaint is defined as follows. For any two states taint , taint ′, h, h′ ∈ R
and σ = (s, op, o) ∈ Σ, δ(taint , h, σ) = (taint ′, h′) if either h = h′ = reject and
taint ′ = taint , or h = accept and the following holds:
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(Data Leakage) h′ = reject iff either (Confidentiality Violation) op = read
and ∃ô ∈ taint(o) such that ô →r s, or (Integrity Violation) op = write and
∃ŝ ∈ taint(s) such that ŝ →w o.
(Taint Propagation) either (Read Propagation) op = read , taint ′(s) =
(taint(s) ∪ taint(o)), and for every x ∈ (S ∪ O) \ {s}, taint ′(s) = taint(s);
or (Write Propagation) op = write, taint ′(o) = (taint(o) ∪ taint(s)), and for
every x ∈ (S ∪ O) \ {o}, taint ′(x) = taint(s).
Theorem 5. Mtaint is an MDLP monitor.
MDLP Monitor Based on 2-Step Tainting: The tainting sets of Mtaint progres-
sively grow as more flows are discovered. In the limit each tainting set potentially
includes all subjects and objects of C. Since for each action the time for checking
confidentiality and integrity violations is proportional to the size of the tainting
sets of the object and subject involved in that action, it is desirable to reduce
the sizes of these sets to get better performances. We achieve this, by defining
a new tainting monitor M2taint that keeps track only of the flows that across at
most two adjacent edges in GC . The correctness of our construction is justified
by the correctness of Mtaint and Theorem 1.
The 2-step tainting monitor M2taint is defined as follows. A state of M2taint
is (as for Mtaint) a map taint : (S ∪ O) → 2(S∪O). Now, a state taint is a start
state if taint(x) = ∅, for every x ∈ (S ∪ O).
The transition relation δ2 of M2taint is defined to guarantee that after reading
a violation free run π of C:
– for every s ∈ S, x ∈ taint(s) iff either (1) x ∈ O, (o, s) is an edge of GC , and
there is a direct flow from x to s in π, or (2) x ∈ S, for some subject ô ∈ O,
(x, ô, s) is a path in GC , and there is a 2-step flow from x to s in π;
– for every o ∈ O, x ∈ taint(o) iff either (1) x ∈ S, (s, o) is an edge of GC , and
there is a direct flow from x to o in π, or (2) x ∈ O, for some subject ŝ ∈ S,
(x, ŝ, o) is a path in GC , and there is a 2-step flow from x to o in π.
Formally, for any two states taint , taint ′, h, h′ ∈ R and σ = (s, op, o) ∈ Σ,
δ2(taint , h, σ) = (taint ′, h′) if either h = h′ = reject and taint ′ = taint , or
h = accept and the following holds:
(Data Leakage) same as for Mtaint ;
(Taint Propagation) either (Read Propagation) op = read , taint ′(s) =
taint(s) ∪ {o} ∪ (taint(o) ∩ S), and for every x ∈ (S ∪ O) \ {s}, taint ′(s) =
taint(s); or (Write Propagation) op = write, taint ′(o) = taint(o) ∪ {s} ∪
(taint(s) ∩ O), and for every x ∈ (S ∪ O) \ {o}, taint ′(x) = taint(s).
From the definition of M2taint it is simple to show (by induction) that the fol-
lowing property holds.
Theorem 6. M2taint is an MDLP monitor. Furthermore, for every C run π ∈
Σ∗, if (taint0, h0), . . . (taintm, hm) and (taint ′0, h
′





tively, the run of Mtaint and M2taint on π, then taint ′i(x) ⊆ taint i(x), for every
i ∈ [1,m] and x ∈ (S ∪ O).
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Therefore, in practice we expect that for large access control systems M2taint
is faster than Mtaint as each tainting sets of M2taint will be local and hence much
smaller in size than those of Mtaint . To show the behavior of the monitor the based
approach, consider again the access control system shown in Table 1, along with
the potential sequence of operations shown in Table 2. Table 2 shows the taints
and monitor’s action for each operation in the sequence. Note that the monitor
blocks a total of six permissions (2 each on operations (2), (3), and (5)).
Table 2. Sample sequence of actions and monitor’s behavior
User’s operation Actions taken
1 s1, r, o1 taint(s1) = {o1}
2 s1, w, o3 taint(o3) = {s1, o1} Monitor will block o3 →r s3 o3 →r s4
to remove the confidentiality vulnerabilities
3 s1, w, o4 taint(o4) = {s1, o1} Monitor will block o4 →r s3 o4 →r s4
to remove the confidentiality vulnerabilities
4 s2, w, o4 taint(o4) = {s1, o1, s2}
5 s4, r, o4 taint(s4) = {s1, s2, o4} Monitor will block s4 →w o6 and
s4 →w o7 to remove the integrity vulnerability
6 s3, r, o3 Access denied
7 s4, w, o7 Access denied
5 Experimental Evaluation
We now present the experimental evaluation which demonstrates the perfor-
mance and restrictiveness of the two proposed approaches. We utilize four real
life access control data sets with users and permissions – namely, (1) fire1, (2)
fire2, (3) domino, (4) hc [12]. Note that these data sets encode a simple access
control matrix denoting the ability of a subject to access an object (in any access
mode). Thus, these data sets do not have the information regarding which par-
ticular permission on the object is granted to the subject. Therefore, we assume
for all of the datasets that each assignment represents both a read and a write
permission on a distinct object.
For the data leakage free by design approach, we use the reduced access con-
trol matrices obtained by collapsing equivalent subjects and objects, as discussed
in Sect. 3. The number of subjects and objects in the original and reduced matri-
ces are given in Table 3. Note that collapsing subjects and objects significantly
reduces the sizes of the datasets (on average the dataset is reduced by 93.99%).
Here, by size, we mean the product of the number of subjects and objects. Since
the number of constraints is linearly proportional to the number of permissions
which depends on the number of subjects and objects, a reduction in their size
leads to a smaller ILP problem.
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Table 3. Dataset details
Dataset Name Original size Reduced size Percentage
Subjects Objects Subjects Objects Reduction
1 fire1 365 709 90 87 96.97 %
2 fire2 325 590 11 11 99.94 %
3 domino 79 231 23 38 95.21 %
4 hc 46 46 18 19 83.84 %
We implement the solution approaches described above. For the data leakage
free by design approach (Sect. 3), we create the appropriate ILP model as per
Fig. 3. The ILP model is then executed using IBM CPLEX (v 12.5.1) running
through callable libraries within the code. For the monitor based approach, the
M2taint monitor is implemented. The algorithms are implemented in C and run
on a Windows machine with 16 GB of RAM and Core i7 2.93 GHz processor.
Table 4 presents the experimental results for the Data Leakage Free by Design
approach. The column “Orig. CPLEX Time”, shows the time required to run
the ILP formulation given in Fig. 2, while the column “Red. CPLEX Time” gives
the time required to run the compact ILP formulation given in Fig. 3. As can be
seen, the effect of collapsing the subjects and objects is enormous. fire1 and fire2
could not be run (CPLEX gave an out of memory error) for the original access
control matrix, while the time required for hc and domino was several orders
of magnitude more. Since we use the reduced datasets, as discussed above, the
column “Threats” reflects the number of threats in the reduced datasets to be
eliminated. The next three columns depict the amount of permission revocation
to achieve a data leakage free access matrix. Note that, here we list the number
of permissions revoked in the original access control matrix. On average, 25.28%
of the permissions need to be revoked to get an access control system without
any data leakages.
When we have a monitor, as discussed in Sect. 4, revocations can occur on the
fly. Therefore, to test the relative performance of the monitor based approach,
we have randomly generated a set of read/write operations that occur in the
order they are generated. The monitor based approach is run and the number of










1 - 2582 34240 63902 14586 22.83 %
2 - 0.225 514 72856 12014 16.49 %
3 8608.15 6.01 3292 1460 421 28.84 %
4 1262.82 0.27 1770 2972 980 32.97 %
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Table 5. Results for monitor based approach
Dataset # Perm. Init. Assn. Number permissions blocked % Finally
blocked
10% 50% 100% 1000% 5000% 10000%
1 63902 0 140 532 14221 24031 26378 41.28 %
2 72856 0 13 26 3912 8129 9025 12.39 %
3 1460 0 36 41 130 283 364 24.93 %
4 2972 0 0 0 557 1123 1259 42.36 %
permissions revoked is counted. Since the number of flows can increase as more
operations occur, and therefore lead to more revocations, we actually count the
revocations for a varying number of operations. Specifically, for each dataset, we
generate on average 100 operations for every subject (i.e., we generate 100 ∗ |S|
number of random operations). Thus, for hc, since there are 46 subjects, we
generate 4600 random operations, where as for fire1 which has 365 subjects, we
generate 36500 random operations. Now, we count the number of permissions
revoked if only 10% ∗ |S| operations are carried out (and similarly for 50% ∗ |S|,
100% ∗ |S|, 1000% ∗ |S|, 5000% ∗ |S|, and finally 10000% ∗ |S|). Table 5 gives the
results. Again, we list the number of permissions revoked in the original access
control matrix. As we can see, the number of permissions revoked is steadily
increasing, and in the case of fire1 and hc the final number of permissions revoked
is already larger than the permissions revoked in the data leakage free method.
Also, note that in the current set of experiments, we have set a window size of
1000 – this means that if the gap between a subject reading an object and then
writing to another object is more than 1000 operations, then we do not consider
a data flow to have occurred (typically a malicious software would read and then
write in a short duration of time) – clearly, the choice of 1000 is arbitrary, and
in fact, could be entirely removed, to ensure no data leakages. In this case, the
number of permission revocations would be even larger than what is reported,
thus demonstrating the benefit of the data leakage free approach when a large
number of operations are likely to be carried out.
6 Related Work
The importance of preventing inappropriate leakage of data, often called the
confinement problem in computer systems, first identified by Lampson in early
70’s [20], is defined as the problem of assuring the ability to limit the amount
of damage that can be done by malicious or malfunctioning software. The need
for a confinement mechanism first became apparent when researchers noted an
important inherent limitation of DAC – the Trojan Horse Attack, and with the
introduction of the Bell and LaPadula model and the MAC policy. Although
MAC compliant systems prevent inappropriate leakage of data, these systems
are limited to multi-level security.
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While MAC is not susceptible to Trojan Horse attacks, many solutions pro-
posed to prevent any such data leakage exploit employing labels or type based
access control. Boebert et al. [3], Badger et al. [1] and Boebert and Kain [4]
are some of the studies that address confidentiality violating data flows. Mao et
al. [21] propose a label based MAC over a DAC system. The basic idea of their
approach is to associate read and write labels to objects and subjects. These
object labels are updated dynamically to include the subject’s label when the
subject reads or writes to that object. Moreover, the object label is a monoton-
ically increasing set of items, with the cardinality in the order of the number
of users read (wrote) the object. Their approach detects integrity violating data
flows. Zimmerman et al. [32] propose a rule based approach that prevents any
integrity violating data flow. Jaume et al. [17] propose a dynamic label updating
procedure that detects if there is any confidentiality violating data flow.
Information Flow Control (IFC) models [10,18] are closely related to our
problem. IFC model is a fine-grained information flow model which is also based
on tainting and utilizes labels for each piece of data that is required to be pro-
tected using the lattice model for information flow security by [9]. The models
can be at software or OS level depending on the granularity of the control and
centralized or decentralized depending on the authority to modify labels [24].
However, these models do not consider the permission assignments, which makes
them different than our model.
Dynamic taint analysis is also related to our problem. Haldar et al. [16]
propose a taint based approach for programs in Java, and Lam et al. [19] propose
a dynamic taint based analysis on C. Enck et al. [11] provide a taint based
approach to track third party Android applications. Cheng et al. [6], Clause
et al. [7] and Zhu et al. [31] propose software level dynamic tainting.
Sze et al. [26] study the problem of self-revocation, where a revocation in the
permission assignments of any subject on an object while editing it might cause
confidentiality and integrity issues. They also study the problem of integrity
violation by investigating the source code and data origin of suspected malware
and prevent any process that is influenced from modifying important system
resources [27]. Finally, the work by Gong and Qian [15] focuses on detecting
the cases where confidentiality and integrity flows occur due to interoperation
of distinct access control systems. They study the complexity to detect such
violations.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have proposed a methodology for identifying and eliminating
unauthorized data flows in DAC, that occur due to Trojan Horse attacks. Our
key contribution is to show that a transitive closure is not required to elim-
inate such flows. We then propose two alternative solutions that fit different
situational needs. We have validated the performance and restrictiveness of the
proposed approaches with real data sets. In the future, we plan to propose an
auditing based approach which eliminates unauthorized flows only if the flows
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get realized. This might be useful to identify the data leakage channels that are
actually utilized. We also plan to extend our approach to identify and prevent
the unauthorized flows in RBAC, which is also prone to Trojan Horse attacks.
Analysis on RBAC is more challenging since there is an additional layer of com-
plexity (roles) that must be taken into account. The preventive action decisions
must overcome the dilemma of whether to revoke the role from the user or revoke
the permission from the role.
Appendix
7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Assume that S and O are the set of subjects and objects of C, respectively.
Let C′ = (S,O,→solr ,→solw ) and C′′ = (S,O,→solr [s1/s2],→solw [s1/s2]).
We first prove (by contradiction) that Sol ′′ is a feasible solution of I. Assume
that C′′ has a threat. This threat is witnessed by a flow path, say ρ, that must
contain s2. If ρ does not involve s2 then ρ would also be a threat in C′, which
cannot be true as Sol ′ is a feasible solution of I. Now, observe that s2 can
always be replaced by s1 along any flow path of C′′, as s2 and s1 have the same
neighbor in GC′′ . Thus, the flow path obtained by replacing s2 with s1 along ρ,
also witnesses a threat in C′. Again a contradiction. Therefore, Sol ′′ is a feasible
solution of I.
We now prove that Sol ′′ is also optimal (that is, size(Sol ′) = size(Sol ′′))
by showing that s1 and s2 have the same number of incident edges in GC′ . Let
n1 (respectively, n2) be the number of incident nodes of s1 (respectively, s2) in
GC′ . By contradiction, and w.l.o.g., assume that n1 > n2. Since C′′ is obtained
from C′ by removing first the permissions of s2 and then adding to s2 the same
permissions of s1, it must be the case that size(Sol ′′) > size(Sol ′). This would
entail that Sol ′ is not an optimal solution, which is a contradiction.
7.2 Proof of Theorem2
NP-membership. Let Sol = (→′r,→′w) such that →′r,→′w⊆ S × O. To check
whether Sol is a feasible solution of I, we need to check that (1) →tr⊆→′r⊆→r,
(2) →tw⊆→′w⊆→w, (3) | →′r | + | →′w | ≥ K, and more importantly, (4) that
(S,O,→′r,→′w) is an ACS that does not contain any threat. The first three
properties are easy to realize in polynomial time. Concerning the last property,
we exploit Theorem 1. To check that there is no confidentiality threat, we build
all sequences of the form o0 →′r s0 →′w o1 →′r s1 and then verify the existence
of the read permission o0 →′r s1. Similarly, for integrity threat we build all
sequences such that s0 →′w o0 →′r s0 →′w o1 and then check the existence of
the write permission s0 →′w o1. Note that, all these sequences can be built in
O(O2 · S2) and these checks can all be accomplished in polynomial time. This
shows that D-MDFP belongs to NP.
NP-hardness. For the NP-hardness proof, we provide a polynomial time reduc-
tion from the edge deletion transitive digraph problem (ED-TD) to D-MDFP.
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The ED-TD asks to remove the minimal number of edges from a given directed
graph such that the resulting graph corresponds to its transitive closure. ED-TD
problem is known to be NP-complete (see [28] Theorem 15, and [29]).
The reduction is as follows. Let G = (V,E) be a directed graph with set of
nodes V = {1, 2, . . . n} and set of edges E ⊆ (V × V ). We assume that nodes of
G do not have self-loops. We now define the instance IG = (CG, TG) of D-MDFP
to which G is reduced to. Let CG = (S,O,→r,→w) and TG = (→tr,→tw). CG
has a subject si and an object oi, for each node i ∈ V . Moreover, there is a
read permission from oi to si, and a write permission from si to oi, for every
node i ∈ V . These permissions are also trusted, i.e., belonging to →tr and →tw,
respectively; and no further permissions are trusted. Furthermore, for every edge
(i, j) ∈ E, there is a read permission from oi to sj , and a write permission from
si to oj . Formally, S = {si | i ∈ V } and O = {oi | i ∈ V }; →tr = {(oi, si) |
i ∈ V }; →tw = {(si, oi) | i ∈ V }; →r = →tr ∪ {(oi, sj) | (i, j) ∈ E};
→w = →tw ∪ {(si, oj) | (i, j) ∈ E}.
Lemma 2. Let G be a directed graph with nodes V = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and Sol =
(→′r,→′w) be a feasible solution of IG. For any i, j ∈ V with i = j, oi →′r sj if
and only if si →′w oj.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Consider first the case when oi →′r sj and
si →′w oj . Observe that, si →′w oi and sj →w oj exist as both of them are
trusted permissions of IG. Thus, si →′w oi →′r sj →w oj is an integrity threat,
leading to a contradiction. The case when oi →′r sj and si →′w oj is symmetric,
and we omit it here.
We now show that the transformation defined above from G to IG is indeed
a polynomial reduction from ED-TD to D-MDFP. The NP-hardness directly
follows from the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let G be a directed graph with n nodes. G contains a subgraph G′
with K edges whose transitive closure is G′ itself if and only IG admits a feasible
solution Sol of size 2 · (n + K).
Proof. Let G = (V,E) with V = {1, 2, . . . , n}, G′ = (V,E′), IG = (CG, TG)
where CG = (S,O,→r,→w) and TG = (→tr,→tw), and Sol = (→′r,→′w).
“only if” direction. Assume that G′ is the transitive closure of itself and |E′| = K.
We define Sol as follows: →′r = →tr ∪ {oi →r sj | (i, j) ∈ E′} and →′w = →tw
∪ {si →w oj | (i, j) ∈ E′}. From the definition of IG, it is straightforward to see
that size(Sol) = 2·(n+K). To conclude the proof we only need to show that Sol is
a feasible solution of IG. Since →tr⊆→′r and →tw⊆→′w we are guaranteed that Sol
contains all trusted permissions of TG. We now show that C′ = (S,O,→′r,→′w)
does not contain any threat. Assume that there is a threat in C′. By Theorem 1,
there must be a threat of length one. If it is a confidentiality threat, then oi →′r
sk →′w oz →′r sj and oi →′r sj , for some i, k, z, j ∈ V with i = j. From the
definition of IG, it must be the case that there is a path from node i to node j in G′
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and (i′, j) /∈ E which leads to a contradiction. The case of integrity vulnerabilities
is symmetric.
“if” direction. Assume that Sol is a feasible solution of IG of size 2 · (n+K). We
define E′ = {(i, j) | i = j ∧ oi →′r sj}. Note that, in the definition of E′ using
permission si →′w oj rather than oi →′r sj would lead to the same set of edges
E′ (see Lemma 2). By the definition of IG and Lemma 2, it is direct to see the
G′ is a subgraph of G and |E′| = K. We now show that the transitive closure
of G′ is again G′. By contradiction, assume that there is a path from node i to
node j in G′ and there is no direct edge from i to j. But this implies that in the
access control system (S,O,→′r,→′w) there is a sequence of alternating read and
write operations from object oi to subject sj and oi →′r sj , which witnesses a
confidentiality threat. This is a contradiction as Sol is a feasible solution of IG.
7.3 Proof of Theorem4
Proof. Let I = (C, T ), ̂Solη≈I = (→̂r
sol
, →̂wsol), C′ = (S,O, →̂rsol , →̂wsol), and
C≈ = (S≈, O≈,→≈r ,→≈w). We first show that ̂Solη≈I is a feasible solution of
I. Assume by contradiction that C′ has a one-step confidentiality threat, say
o →solr ŝ →solw o′ →solr s ∧ o →solr s. It is easy to see that [o] →≈r [ŝ] →≈w
[o′] →≈r [s] ∧ [o] →≈r [s] holds, but this is not possible since Compact-ILP-
formulation(I) contains a constraint that prevents that these relations hold
conjunctly. A similar proof exists for integrity vulnerabilities. Therefore, ̂Solη≈I
is a feasible solution of I.
Now, we show that ̂Solη≈I is also optimal. Assume by contradiction that
̂Solη≈I is not optimal, and Sol = (→solr ,→solw ) is an optimal solution of I where
all equivalent subjects/objects have the same permissions. The existence of Sol
is guaranteed by Corollary 1. Now, we reach a contradiction showing that ηI
is not optimal for Compact-ILP-formulation(I). For every s ∈ S, o ∈ O,
η(r[o],[s]) = 1 (respectively, η(w[s],[o]) = 1) if and only if o →solr s (respectively,
s →solw o) holds. Notice that η is well defined because all subjects/objects in
the same equivalent class have the same permissions in Sol . It is straightfor-
ward to prove that η allows to satisfy all linear constraints of Compact-ILP-
formulation(I), and more importantly leads to a greater value of the objective
function. Note that, for the variable assignment η the objective function has a
value nη = size(Sol) whereas has value nηI = size( ̂Solη≈I ) for the assignment η
≈
I .
Now, nη > nηI , and it cannot be true because η
≈
I is an optimal assignment. The
definition of η and the fact that it satisfies all linear constraints shows that if I
admits a solution then it shows that Compact-ILP-formulation(I) admits a
solution. Therefore, η≈I also exists.
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